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Why do corporations accept voluntary codes on corporate governance and why is
the acceptance so rapid among the corporations? A Theoretical Explanation

Abstract

Implementation of principles of the Codes on Corporate Governance (CCG) is aimed at
minimizing agency conflicts and corporate governance problems in the listed firms but
we see them emerging over and over again despite the rapid implementation of CCG by
listed firms, motivate us to develop this theoretical framework to understand why do the
firms accept the voluntary principles and what type of behaviours could be expected
among and between the top management personnel.

Introduction
Due to the adaptability to suit the needs of listed firms, codes on corporate governance
have become popular in listed companies across many market economies (Gregory &
Simmelkjaer, 2002) and in many emerging market economies big and small such as
China (Tam, 2000), Taiwan (Luan and Tang, 2007) and Sri Lanka (Gunetilleke, 2009).
The rapid implementation of the codes on corporate governance has caused to strengthen
the board and the role of NEDs to avoid agency conflicts and many other corporate
governance problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Pass, 2004,
Cromme, 2005). However, empirical studies find that the agency conflicts and corporate
governance problems emerge repeatedly (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2006; Luo, 2006).
The editorial of the Wall Street Journal (2008) points out that even the mandatory
regulation of Sarbanes – Oxley Act 2002 has not succeeded entirely to prevent frauds in
the context of US. Luo (2006) shows a variety of managerial opportunisms such as
behaviour performed by one party to seek unilateral gains at the expense of another party
or parties by breaching explicit or implicit agreements, exercising private control,
withholding or distorting information, withdrawing commitments or promises, shirking
obligations, or grafting joint earnings.

Therefore, what we see is a ‘paradoxical compliance’ (MacDonald, Nail & Levy,
2004:78), that is the acceptance of codes on corporate governance and at the same time
emerging corporate governance problems. Therefore, we have an ‘intellectual puzzle’
(Mason, 1986:15) as to why do the listed firms voluntarily accept the principles of codes
on corporate governance? and why the acceptance of them is so rapid across the firms?
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The aim of this paper is to answer this intellectual puzzle by paying particular attention to
type of behaviours among CEOs and NEDs through a theoretical analysis and subsequent
formulation of propositions, which is structured as follows. First, we highlight the
significance of the exploration of the issue. Then, we explain the ideas of voluntary code
of corporate governance and provide evidence to justify the paradoxical issue. The final
and the major section of the article are the presentation of supportive literature and
formulation of propositions.

The intended theoretical analysis is important for number of reasons. First, the
implementation of the principles of codes by a firm costs to stakeholders. The cost may
include quantifiable items such as payment for the NEDs to attend the meetings,
travelling expenses, remuneration of Chair and so on and non-quantifiable expenses such
as allocation of the time of executives to prepare various reports for the NEDs and Chair
(Vafeas, 2003). According to the Financial Reporting Council in the UK (FRC, 2006),
various elements of costs to be borne by the listed companies include, fees for the new
NEDs, costs for tailored induction for new directors, cost for training and development of
the skills and knowledge of NEDs, performance evaluation of the board, additional
company secretarial resources and insurance cover. These expenses are to be borne none
other than the shareholders. In the case of mandatory regulations, a part of cost is born by
taxpayers and regulatory bodies such as the Registrar of Companies and the Independent
Oversight Bodies appointed under the direction of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act, 2002 in the
US (Anand, 2005). In the case of voluntary compliance and less mandatory regulations,
investors have to bear the cost of monitoring. Therefore, better corporate governance is
required to reduce these expenditures.
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In addition, corporate governance in listed companies is important due to the creation of
employment opportunities, contribution to the economy of a country and cross border
capital flows etc. (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008). Failure of corporate governance
results in a huge social cost to the society especially to taxpayers as evidenced by the
historical case of the South Sea Bubble (Chapman, 1986) and with many collapses in
1990s such as the Bearing Bank, Enron and World Com and very recent bankruptcies
such as the Northern Rock bank in the UK and Lehman Brothers (Šević, 2005). Authors
have studied various factors which influence the listed companies in their choice of
internal corporate governance mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Bathala & Rao, 1995).
However, there is a gap in the literature to understand the factors, which could influence
the listed companies to comply with the voluntary codes on corporate governance.
Therefore, our analysis could be a significant contribution for corporate governance
literature in particular and to organisational practices in general.

Voluntary Codes of Corporate Governance
Security Exchange Commissions or the regulators of the public limited liability
companies (PLCs) in many countries have introduced non-regulatory codes or voluntary
codes on corporate governance. Code of Best Practices, popularly known as the Cadbury
guidelines (Cadbury, 1992) and the subsequent introduction of many other codes provide
guidelines for the PLCs to improve corporate governance practicei. The present
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2008) has incorporated many of these
guidelines as main principles and provisions which consist: (1) separation of the role of
the Chair and the CEO, (2) appointment of majority of NEDs, (3) appointment of number
5

of sub committees of the board of directors comprising only the NEDs (audit,
remuneration and nomination), and (4) appointment of a senior independent director to
liaise between the institutional investors and the board as well as the NEDs and the Chair.

These principles and provisions have been incorporated as listing rules in the London
Stock Exchange (LSE). PLCs in the Main Market of the LSE are required to either
comply with or explain the reasons for not complying with the Combined Code (FRC,
2008). A large number of companies in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the
LSE also implement some of the principles of the above code when they are only
encouraged to think of getting the benefit of accepting the guidelines of the Combined
Code (Gunetilleke, 2009). ‘Comply or explain’ (FRC, 2008:1) principle suggests listed
companies to choose the best practices to suit the size of the firm, future needs and
potential agency conflicts rather than pushing firms on to a mandatory compliance or to a
model of ‘one-size fit-all’ (Filatotchev, 2005:26) such as the Sarbanes - Oxley Act 2002.
Studies of Piotroski & Srinivasan (2007) point out that some of the firms de-listed from
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have listed in the AIM in the LSE in order to
avoid mandatory regulations of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act 2002 and some Initial Public
Offers (IPOs) have opted to go to the AIM instead of listing in the NYSE.

Corporations are Social Units
6

Understanding the reasons for the emergence of mandatory company regulations such as
the Companies Acts and non-mandatory regulations such as the CCG is required in the
context of the broader social framework. Social contract theory argues that the citizens of
a country and the government enter into a contract and accordingly, government has to
take necessary actions to meet the expectations of the society. Authors argue that the
listed firms are social units with a specific role to play in the economy and the society
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). According to Aguilera et al., (2006), firms are situated
within a given society and political tradition, which will influence the decisions of
individuals within the firm. Of course, corporations are an essential integral in the
organizational society (Morgan, 1997) and therefore whether they be large or small,
companies are social units as they are created to fulfill the expectations of the society
(Ducker, 1974). When there is a threat for the normal situation, a government comes
under pressure from the society to take corrective action (McCormick, 1976). Corporate
failures in the capital markets have been such a trigger to disrupt the status quo in the
society as evidenced by the corporate collapses.

Influence of social forces on managerial behaviour
Organisational man is a social and political animal and the behaviour is conditioned by
the social norms and values in the organisation Gibson (1966). As noted in the Social
identification theory (Obst & White, 2005), the members of a society whether known or
unknown to each other build up a ‘Psychological sense of community, in which the
foundation is the acceptance of the social norms and values. In such a community, a little
request to comply for something could lead to a large compliance (Scott, 1977).
Structures and processes build up to accommodate and pull individuals into the line of
7

beliefs and practices of the society. If there is a deviant behaviour, punishments are
inevitable and the rewards are offered for the obedient members across all the structured
organisations such as the armed forces, educational institutions, religious places and in
business organisations (Sonnenfeld, 1985).

The nature of such social units is to associate with the likely minds and to follow the
social norms established in order to maintain the coherent values and the program of
actions (Kadushin, 2002). In order to ensure that the members follow the structured
norms and values, Bowles & Gintis (2002) argue that informal build up of social norms
stand up to avoid any threats for the stability and the orderly conduct of the norms and
values. Bothner (2003) argues that when a social actor’s rivals have adopted an
advantageous trait, that actor is then likely to adopt it in order to avert the probable social
and economic costs of falling behind. Feldman (1984) also points out that ‘Informal rules
adopt to regularize group members’ behaviour. As such, PLCs operate to achieve not
only the individual corporate objectives but also to protect common interests of them,
especially when there are threats to change the existing structures such as statutory and
non-statutory rules and regulations (Ornstein, 1984). Accordingly, Organisational men
(Gibson, 1966), such as the board of directors, CEOs, the elites in top management
(Pettigrew, 1992) are influential in maintaining a certain framework of social norms in
the business society (Mizruchi, 1983).

Managers with social contact networks monitor information more effectively (Burt,
1997). Network structures are a key decisive force on the speed of spreading the
governance practices and expose a firm to a particular role model (Davis & Greve, 1997).
8

Thus, managers have a collective informal behaviour due to the influence of the interlock
directorates (Davis, 1991). Therefore, corporate actions are not determined solely by the
characteristics of their own but also by the actions and characteristics of other
organizations in its environment (Davis, 1991).

Ornstein (1984) investigating the interlocking directorships of more than 5,000 interlocks
among the largest Canadian companies during the period of 1946 to 1977 argues that
interlocking directorates serve to coordinate the political and ideological orientation of
the capitalist society. Accordingly, boards are viewed as vehicles that corporations use to
control other corporations, to co-opt threats in their environment from competitors,
suppliers, customers, and regulatory agencies. Similarly, D’Aveni & Kesner (1993) argue
that Cooperation and resistance may be a function of the social networks and power
relationships that exists between and within firms. Thus, social influences lead to
‘Coercive isomorphism’ or the acceptance of a certain pattern of behaviour under
influence (Ashforth & Gibbs (1990:178). In such situations, the CEOs as well as the
NEDs could become the targets to overt conformity (Quiamzade et al., 2003). Stiles &
Taylor (2001) argue that executives would follow the plans of chief executives, but may
not agree with the plans in private but approve as they depend on the CEO for their own
ambition of reaching to the top position of the firm. As such, an individual has to subdue
self-conscientiousness of the need to resist for external influences. PLCs may comply for
a certain way of doing business collectively in order to avoid any damage on business
(Bothner, 2003). Reflecting this reality, Neilson & Rao (1987) argue that people do not
speak openly about information and ideas if it might harm their chances at achieving their
objectives or if it validates their standards of personal development. Does this necessarily
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mean that there can be gaps between social expectations and actual behaviour of
managers?

According to Soeters (1986), the model of excellent companies (Peter & Waterman,
1982) highlights behaviours similar to the norms and values of cults in the US that
existed during 1980s. In cults, there is a certain belief about the world and life with a
strong leadership and devoted set of followers who do not question the beliefs and the
values other than sharing them with the fellow members (Stark & Bainbridge, 1980). The
values and the beliefs bind them all together. Similarly, in the excellent companies, the
employees were groomed to believe of certain values in business and each and everybody
shared the same irrespective of the position of the firm. The tendency to maintain and
build relations is high in the right context. Grossetti (2005) argues that the social relations
are created among people when they have close interests and are aroused out of certain
contexts but rarely on chance meetings. The argument behind shared values and
principles of culture of an organisation also justify this view point. As human beings are
frequently motivated to create and maintain social relationships with others (Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004), it is important to note that mutual gains solidify those relationships
(Jensen & Greve, 2002), which may lead to create strong social processes (Ryan, 1999).

In the above context of social influence for the individual role in corporations,
organisational men (Gibson, 1966), compare and contrast their practices with the others
in similar level or above their levels of operations and follow the same pattern (Suls,
Martin & Wheeler, 2002; Shackleton, 2005). Thus, the mimetic behaviour is a natural
phenomenon. As Hong, Kubik & Stein (2004) observed, the transactions of stocks in the
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stock exchange by shareholders are influenced by the decisions of peer groups. In order
to stand for the common needs of a larger society and to maintain social legitimacy,
companies are keen to maintain public relations (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989). Public
relations through social interactions help companies to fall in line with the societal values
(Monks & Minow, 2004). When a company does business respecting the societal and
ethical values of a society apart from the legal compliance (Goodpaster, 1991), it gains
social legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Falling in line with the above arguments of social
influences and interactions, Menon & Williams (1994) argue that the formation of sub
committees of the board is an attempt to show good governance to make the shareholders
pleased. As such Weir & Laing (2001) questioned, do companies regard complying with
Cadbury as a public relations exercise? In line with these realities and arguments, we
derive our first proposition.

Proposition 1: Corporations implement the principles and provisions of the voluntary
Codes on Corporate Governance due to either isomorphic or mimetic
behavior or the both

Resistance to Social Influences
If the acceptance of corporate governance codes were purely in view of the needs of the
investors other than the influence of the social forces, investors would be lucky to get
‘informed decisions’ (Monks and Minow, 2004:83). Private firms may find it difficult to
attract investors by IPOs due to lack of trust by investors (Pagano, Panetta & Zingales,
1998). In general, information plays the key role in making informed decision by market
participants and therefore the availability of information in the corporate sector suggests a
good state of financial transparency and governance transparency (Bushman, Piotroski &
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Smith, 2004). As Fama & Jensen (1983) argue shareholders are risk experts in
diversifying the portfolio of investments but face the problem of information asymmetry
as the managers withhold some information. With regard to the link between information
and corporate governance mechanism, a number of authors find that corporate
governance mechanisms such as the appointment of NEDs and the separation of chair and
the CEO would result in increased disclosures and strong incentives for the shareholders
to remain loyal with their investments (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Bushman, Piotroski &
Smith, 2004; Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006).

According to some scholars (Schmidt & Spindler, 2002); Zahra & Filatotchev 2004),
specific corporate governance mechanisms of a firm would be decided by path
dependence, level of knowledge acquisition and contingencies and life cycle stage of a
firm. As such, Filatotchev (2005) argues that the development of ‘one size fits all’
corporate governance codes may be highly problematic for firms at different thresholds in
their life cycle. Similarly, Pye & Camm (2003) also questioned about the rationality of a
particular model for all the companies. For example, Finkelstein & D’Aveni (1994) point
out that the holding of both the role of Chair and CEO by a single hand (duality) is
required when a firm needs to map out strong strategies and to implement and monitor
the performance of executives at crises. They suggest that when a firm has continuous
success in the market, it is required to separate the office of Chair and CEO. Unless the
separation of office of Chair and CEO is done, CEO becomes powerful with the good
results and gets entrenched.
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Some firms resort to the minimum legal requirements to practice corporate governance
codes due to switching costs (Hart, 1995, Vafeas, 1999). In a study of the implications of
de-regulations in the US on the airline industry, Kole & Lehn (1997) found that the
corporate governance structures evolve to suit the competition and the inability to make
the changes in a firm lead to disappearance of the same from the market place. According
to them, firms that survive in competitive markets are presumed to have optimal
governance structures. In addition, Li (1994) finds that the ownership structure, the
degree of leverage, size of the firm, level of performance in the market and strategy of the
firm decide the structural composition of the board. Williams, Fadil & Artmstrong (2005)
also argue that moderate size of a board has the ability of minimising illegal activities in
organisations when they have complex structures and scattered markets. Accordingly, we
develop our second proposition.

Proposition 2: Corporations which comply with selected principles and provisions of the
Codes on Corporate Governance do so due to their own specific needs
and are not influenced by isomorphic or mimetic behavior.

Codes on corporate Governance and the Behaviour of CEOs and NEDs
When there are more NEDs than the insider directors or the executive directors in the
board, the ability of the CEO to enjoy privileges such as the appointment of the desired
personnel rather than the best, give them promotions and maintaining perquisites such as
luxurious offices (Berle & Means, 1933) and higher compensation for self and favoured
executives could be limited (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005). Therefore, the excessive
monitoring by NEDs would lead the CEO to find ways of reaching the NEDs and
enhancing his or her power base through impression management (Gardner & Martinko,
1988; Westphal, 1998). The tenure of a CEO is a decisive factor to influence the NEDs as
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more the tenure of work experience of a CEO more the knowledge and ability to
influence the NEDs to approve business plans (Hill & Phan, 1991). CEO has the
authority of the information system in the firm and the willingness to provide information
required by the NEDs seems to rest upon the CEO. Impression management tactics of the
CEO towards the NEDs would result in recognition of the abilities of the CEO by the
NEDs and in securing approval for his plans of diversification decisions (Walsh &
Seward, 1990). CEO’s are keen to diversify through mergers and takeovers because they
have no any other way of diversifying their own risk of job survival (Amihud & Lev,
1981). In their study on the relationship between CEO and the board, Zajac & Westphal
(1996) also agree with the above view as they suggest that by diversifying into unrelated
businesses, managers can stabilize their investment portfolios and reduce their
employment risk.

With regard to relationship between executive directors and CEOs, Katz & Kahn (1978)
argue that a relationship built among colleagues centred on the CEO during a long-term
period bind them all strong as a group. The charisma of a CEO results in creating
favourable attribution among the followers because a successful CEO creates a sense of
mission and an inspirational vision (Waldman et al., 2004). The relationships built on
these practices would lead to a high level of cohesiveness and therefore tend to take
action jointly. Hambrick & Mason (1984) also agree with the above contention that CEOs
share tasks and to some extent power with other team members. All these arguments are
in line with Drucker’s (1974) assertion that large organisations face unstructured,
complex and uncertain decision environments and therefore, it is difficult for a single
person to take managerial responsibilities.
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Exploring another aspect of these relationships further, Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani
(1996) note that executive directors depend on the CEO for their promotions and future
career expectations. Offer of outsider executive directorships to insider executives is
mainly decided by the relational power of the executives to the CEO (Richardson, 1987).
Executive directors get their power through their position and relationships with the CEO
(Minszberg, 1983). Thus, the protection of the CEO from an emerging power will be
considered as important by the executive directors. Unless it is done, all the privileges
enjoyed by the long stay of executives in the company will be lost. In this context, it
could be expected that a CEO be supported by the subordinates to face any threats in the
environment including the regulatory bodies. Katz & Kahn (1978) of course argue that a
relationship built among colleagues centred on the CEO during a long-term period bind
them all strong as a group. Therefore, the NEDs could be considered by them as a threat
for their usual way of making decisions in strategy formulation and day-to-day
operations. As such, Walsh & Seward (1990), argue that Managerial or CEO’s behaviour
could cripple the corporate governance mechanisms. In the long run, in the context of
polarisation of relations between the NEDs and the executive directors due to the
widened information asymmetry, lack of strategic thinking and faulty attributions for
success and failure by both the board and the management could occur (Sundaramurthy
& Lewis, 2003). As a result, a corporation would not be competitive in the market and
eventually would collapse (Thusman & Oreilly, 1996). If the working relationship of the
management and the board were good, it would create a situation to get the best possible
corporate governance mechanisms (Westphall, 1999). Stewardship theory of corporate
governance also believes that the managers are conscious to protect the assets of the
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shareholders (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) and therefore they must be
encouraged. As such, the board tends to be in more supportive mood that in control
mood.
According to Mizruchi, board of directors represents ‘a self-perpetuating oligarchy
accountable to themselves’ (1983:427). The NEDs too are a part of the board. NEDs are
professional referees (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Their future prospects of getting NED posts
elsewhere depend on how they perform in the present corporation. Maintenance of
reputation of the NEDs as expert decision makers enables them to get more directorships
(Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003), more earnings (Yermack, 2004), and higher
positions in the future career (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). However, such developments of
a NED could not always be considered as useful because Baumeister & Exline
(1999:1173) argue that prideful people may be so self focused that they are less prone to
contribute to the group’s welfare or to be willing to make sacrifices for others. Many
researchers argue that the NEDs could behave opportunistically to protect their reputation
(e.g. Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Helland & Sykuta, 2005; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005).
Therefore, there could be a tendency to emphasize more on corporate governance than
the prime role of the director that is directing the corporations to achieve the business
objectives of the shareholders (Jensen & Fuller, 2002). If the NEDs were opportunistic to
serve their own interest as argued above, they would be more interested in outcome
behavior rather than the strategic behavior (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In such situations,
the NEDs would behave opportunistically to claim the good performance of the
corporation as their own effort and in the case of poor performance; they would say that
the CEO has chosen wrong strategies (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Based on the above
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arguments on the behavior of the NEDs to protect their self-interest, we develop the
following proposition.

Proposition 3: Self-serving CEOs and NEDs would insist the implementation of the
codes on corporate governance irrespective of firm specific needs

Conclusions and Implications for Research

Codes on corporate governance and their implementation have become very popular
across many countries. However, empirical studies revealed number of issues associated
with the acceptance of principles of CCG and the behaviors of CEOs and NEDs. In this
paper we attempted to answer the intellectual puzzle of why do listed firms voluntarily
accept the principles of CCG? In addition, what are the types of behaviors among CEOs
and NEDs in the relevant context? Through a theoretical analysis and accompanying
propositions. It was revealed that it is important to understand whether the firms accept
corporate governance in order to improve their own governance or whether to follow the
others (mimetic behaviour) or whether the firms are coerced to follow (isomorphic
behaviour) or else whether the NEDs themselves are keen to protect their goodwill and
thus are strict in corporate governance or else whether the opportunistic CEOs accept
them and make an impression to the market on their firms. This is really a difficult issue
to answer easily. The propositions built on above themes are useful to think in real terms
whether the acceptance of the codes on corporate governance shows best practices in
corporate governance. Authors have documented evidence to support that the type of
internal corporate governance mechanisms are a result of the evolutionary process as well
as on the particular needs of the firms. However, when there are a significant number of
17

companies accept and implement the non-regulatory codes on corporate governance, we
must question why and how as well as the implications of such a change. The pattern of
change will follow a particular direction or route and largely all societies will eventually
go down the same road (Warren, 2003).

So what are the specific countries and

companies who follow the same root? Are there different roots to follow when facing
changing circumstances under new global issues and realities of corporate world?
Answers lie with further exploration of the implementation of CCGs.
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